

Making (near) Optimal Choices for the Design of Block Ciphers

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
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
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Efficient Search for Optimal Diffusion Layers of GFNs
- 3 Variants of the AES Key-Schedule for Better Truncated Differential Bounds
- 4 Perspectives

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
Cryptography and Encryption




Symmetric Encryption



Symmetric Encryption



Block Ciphers



Block Cipher

A block cipher is a family of permutations


$$E : \mathbb{F}_2^s \times \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$$

such that for any $k \in \mathbb{F}_2^s$, $E_k = E(k, \cdot) : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is a permutation.

- k is called the key
- s is called the key length
- n is called the block length


Distinguishers

⇒ Behavior of the block cipher that a random function does not have.



$p \gg 2^{-(n-1)} \Rightarrow$ we have a distinguisher

Substitution-Permutation Networks



A partial example

$k : 0111011010101110\dots$



Key-Schedule



$k_0 : 0111011010101110$

$k_1 : 1011101001011100$

$k_2 : 0111010100000111$

$k_3 : 1111111100010110$

\vdots


A partial example

$p = x_0$: 0101 1010 0111 0101


A partial example

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
 p = x_0 : & 0101 & 1010 & 0111 & 0101 & & & \\
 & & & \oplus & & 0111 & 0110 & 1010 & 1110 & : k_0 \\
 y_0 : & 0010 & 1100 & 1101 & 1011 & & & & &
 \end{array}$$


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



A partial example



Feistel Networks





Finding Optimal Components

Naïve algorithm : exhaustive search

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Pros :

- (Relatively) easy to implement
- Optimality is easy to prove

Finding Optimal Components

Naïve algorithm : exhaustive search

Pros :

- (Relatively) easy to implement
- Optimality is easy to prove

Cons (non-exclusive) :

- The search space can be very large
e.g. From 2^{52} up to 2^{75} in the first part of this presentation
- Testing one candidate can be expensive
e.g. In the second part of this presentation, "only" 2^{44} candidates but testing each of them is expensive

Tools for Optimization

- (Mixed) Integer Linear Programming (and some other variants)
- Constraint Programming
- Metaheuristics (near optimality)
- SAT (somewhat)
- Dedicated algorithms

Tools for Optimization


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- Constraint Programming
- Metaheuristics (near optimality)
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- Dedicated algorithms

In this talk :

- Part 1 : Dedicated algorithm (\sim Branch-and-Bound) + efficient testing for the small cases
- Part 2 : Metaheuristics + Constraint Programming


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Generalized Feistel Network




- State composed of $2k$ blocks
- k Feistels in parallel followed by a permutation π
- Easier to design but slower diffusion

Generalized Feistel Network




- State composed of $2k$ blocks
- k Feistels in parallel followed by a permutation π
- Easier to design but slower diffusion
- In this work, the key and the definition of the F-functions don't matter


Diffusion Round




Diffusion Round




Diffusion Round




Diffusion Round




Diffusion Round



Diffusion Round




Diffusion Round




- Depends only on π
- Tied to impossible differential and integral attacks
- For encryption...

Diffusion Round



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Diffusion Round



- Depends only on π
- Tied to impossible differential and integral attacks
- For encryption and decryption
- $DR(\pi) = 6$ here

Previous Work

- Suzuki and Minematsu at FSE'10
 - Lower bound on $DR(\pi)$ depending only on k
 - Exhaustive search for $2k \leq 16$
 - Observed that all optimal permutations in these cases are *even-odd*
 - Generic construction with $DR(\pi) = 2 \log_2 k$ (not optimal in general)

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- Cauchois *et al.* at FSE'19
 - Equivalence relation for *even-odd* permutations
 - Optimal *even-odd* permutations for $18 \leq 2k \leq 26$
 - Good candidate for $2k = 32$ (already known from FSE'10) and $2k = 64, 128$

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
Open problem : is the permutation on 32 blocks optimal ?

Diffusion round of 10 but lower bound at 9 rounds.

This Work


- We solve this 10-year-old problem
- New characterization for the diffusion round
⇒ Efficient algorithm to search for an optimal permutation
- Results for $28 \leq 2k \leq 42$
- Security evaluation for all permutations found

Even-odd Permutations



$$\pi = (3, 0, 5, 6, 1, 2, 7, 4)$$


Even-odd Permutations



$$\pi = (3, 0, 5, 6, 1, 2, 7, 4)$$

$$p = (1, 2, 0, 3) \quad \pi(2i) = 2p(i) + 1$$

Even-odd Permutations




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
$$p = (1, 2, 0, 3) \quad \pi(2i) = 2p(i) + 1$$

$$q = (0, 3, 1, 2) \quad \pi(2i + 1) = 2q(i)$$


Ideal Diffusion



Ideal Diffusion




Ideal Diffusion



Ideal Diffusion


$$j_0^5 = p \circ p \circ p \circ p(j)$$




Ideal Diffusion

$$j_0^5 = p \circ p \circ p \circ p(j)$$

$$j_1^5 = q \circ p \circ p \circ p(j)$$



Ideal Diffusion



A Visualization of This Characterization

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
p^5	3	4	5	6	7	0	1	2
p^4q	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^3qp	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^2qp^2	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
pqp^3	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
qp^4	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^2qpq	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
pqp^2q	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
qp^3q	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
$pqpqp$	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
qp^2qp	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
$qpqp^2$	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
$qpqpq$	6	7	0	1	2	3	4	5
diff	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

 \mathbb{J}_j^7

Cyclic Shift

 $p = (7, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$ $q = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)$

A Visualization of This Characterization

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
p^5	3	4	5	6	7	0	1	2
p^4q	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^3qp	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^2qp^2	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
pqp^3	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
qp^4	4	5	6	7	0	1	2	3
p^2qpq	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
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qp^2qp	5	6	7	0	1	2	3	4
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$qpqpq$	6	7	0	1	2	3	4	5
diff	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

 \mathbb{J}_0^7

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A Visualization of This Characterization

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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diff	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

 \mathbb{J}_1^7

Cyclic Shift

 $p = (7, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)$ $q = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)$

A Visualization of This Characterization

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
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$qpqpq$	1	6	4	3	5	7	0	2
diff	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8

Optimal Permutation

 $p = (6, 3, 7, 1, 0, 2, 4, 5)$ $q = (3, 5, 1, 6, 4, 0, 2, 7)$

A Visualization of This Characterization


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p^2qp^2	6	7	4	0	5	2	3	1
pqp^3	1	4	3	2	0	6	7	5
qp^4	2	5	7	6	3	1	4	0
p^2qpq	7	1	0	6	3	5	2	4
pqp^2q	4	5	2	1	7	0	6	3
qp^3q	5	0	6	2	4	3	1	7
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$qpqpq$	1	6	4	3	5	7	0	2
diff	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8

Optimal Permutation

 $p = (6, 3, 7, 1, 0, 2, 4, 5)$ $q = (3, 5, 1, 6, 4, 0, 2, 7)$

Searching for an optimal permutation

- $(k!)^2$ even-odd permutations, reduced to $\mathcal{N}_k \cdot k!$ with an equivalence relation.
 $\mathcal{N}_k :=$ number of partitions of the integer k .
 \Rightarrow For $2k = 32$, $\sim 2^{52}$ permutations instead of $(16!)^2 \simeq 2^{88}$.
- Main idea : partially compute some \mathbb{J}_j^r + Branch-and-Bound



Results and Summary

- New characterization for the diffusion round in a GFN
- **Very efficient search algorithm**, highly parallelizable ($< 1h$ for each case with 72 threads)

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Results and Summary


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- For $2k = 34$, the **optimal** number of rounds for full diffusion is 10.

Results and Summary

- New characterization for the diffusion round in a GFN
- **Very efficient search algorithm**, highly parallelizable ($< 1h$ for each case with 72 threads)
- For $2k = 28, 30, 32$ and 36 , the **optimal** number of rounds for full diffusion is 9.
- For $2k = 34$, the **optimal** number of rounds for full diffusion is 10.
- For $2k = 38, 40$ and 42 , the optimal number of rounds for full diffusion is at least 10 and at most 11.


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Security model



Standard model

Can only ask the encryption of some plaintexts p .



Related-key model

Can ask the encryption of some plaintexts p with a modified key.


(Related-key) Differentials attacks

Given an n -bit block cipher E , can we find a tuple $(\Delta_{in}, \Delta_{out}, \Delta_k) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{3n}$ such that for any message p ,

$$E(k \oplus \Delta_k, p \oplus \Delta_{in}) = E(k, p) \oplus \Delta_{out}$$


holds independently from the value of the key with high probability ?

AES



- 128-bit block cipher, $\{128, 192, 256\}$ -bit key
- Round function :
 - SubBytes (SB, non-linear)
 - $L = \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{ShiftRows}$ (linear)
 - AddRoundKey (\oplus)
- Round keys are derived from the master key using a key schedule KS (non-linear)

Truncated differential characteristic




Only consider whether a difference is zero or not (active byte).

⇒ Easier to search than regular differentials

⇒ Can still give some security results for differential attacks

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
⇒ Can still give some security results for differential attacks

May be impossible to instantiate with regular differentials

⇒ We can consider some additional information to avoid this !

(Induced equations !)

Equations induced by MixColumns (MDS property)




Let $z = \text{MC}(y)$ with $y, z \in (\mathbb{F}_2^8)^4$. Then there is a linear equation between any 5 bytes in y and z .

$$5.y_0 \oplus 7.y_1 \oplus y_3 = 2.z_0 \oplus z_2$$


But y_0, y_1 and y_3 are zero differences, and (z_0, z_2) is cancelled by (k_0, k_2) . Hence $2.k_0 \oplus k_2 = 0$.

Active S-Boxes



Number of active S-boxes \Rightarrow maximal probability of the (truncated) differential characteristic.


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The higher the minimal number of active S-boxes is, the better.

Active S-Boxes




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How to choose the key schedule to maximize the minimal number of active S-Boxes ?

Active S-Boxes



Number of active S-boxes \Rightarrow maximal probability of the (truncated) differential characteristic.

The higher the minimal number of active S-boxes is, the better.

How to choose the key schedule to maximize the minimal number of active S-Boxes ?

\Rightarrow What if we use a **byte-permutation** instead of the original KS ?

Changing the key schedule for a permutation

Using a permutation as key schedule :

- Efficient in both hardware and software
- Easier to analyze
- Better security with simpler design ?
- Khoo *et al.*¹ gave an example of a permutation for AES-128 reaching 22 S-boxes in 7 rounds at FSE'18

¹Khoo, K., Lee, E., Peyrin, T., Sim, S.M.: Human-readable Proof of the Related-Key Security of AES-128, FSE'18

About Khoo *et al.* 's permutation

- Built according to some results in their paper and two criteria :
 - Only having one cycle (of length 16)
 - Minimizing the "overlap" between the Key Schedule and the round function

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
- Reach 22 S-boxes over 7 rounds when considering equations
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Goal : Find a permutation to use instead of the key schedule reaching 22 S-Boxes in 6 rounds (or less ?)

Generic Bounds on 2, 3 and 4 rounds

Formally proven [Our paper]


The optimal bounds for 2, 3 and 4 rounds are respectively 1, 5 and 10 active S-boxes, even when considering induced equations



Generic Bounds on 5, 6 and 7 rounds

Formally proven [Our paper]

The optimal bounds for 5, 6 and 7 rounds are respectively 14, 18 and 21 active S-boxes, *without considering equations*



More precise bound over 5 rounds

Computer aided [Our paper]

There is no permutation that, when used as key schedule, can reach a minimal number of active S-boxes of 18 or higher over 5 rounds.

There is at least one permutation that can reach 16 S-boxes over 5 rounds.


Main idea to search for s S-boxes:

- Build a list of cycles which don't lead to any characteristic of weight $< s$.
- Combine all of them to see if we can find a permutation reaching s S-boxes.


Iteratively building cycles

$(x_0 \ x_1 \ x_2 \ ? \ ? \ \dots)$


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
Iteratively building cycles




Iteratively building cycles



Iteratively building cycles



Iteratively building cycles



Over 6 rounds

More than 2^{44} possible permutations + cost of finding the minimal number of active S-boxes

⇒ Too expensive to try them all !

We have an optimization problem :

Maximize the minimal number of active S-boxes over 6 rounds

Over 6 rounds

More than 2^{44} possible permutations + cost of finding the minimal number of active S-boxes

⇒ Too expensive to try them all !

We have an optimization problem :

Get a high enough minimal number of active S-boxes over 6 rounds

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More than 2^{44} possible permutations + cost of finding the minimal number of active S-boxes

⇒ Too expensive to try them all !

We have an optimization problem :

Get a high enough minimal number of active S-boxes over 6 rounds

Metaheuristic + Constraint Programming



We used a meta-heuristic called *simulated annealing*². Main idea :

- Generate a sequence x_0, x_1, \dots where x_i and x_{i+1} are "close"
- If $f(x_i) > f(x_{i-1})$, accept x_i and search for the next one
- Otherwise only accept x_i with a certain (decreasing) probability
- Choose another x_i if it was rejected
- Stop when $f(x_i)$ reach a certain threshold

²Nikolić, *How to use metaheuristics for design of symmetric-key primitives* - ASIACRYPT'17

Constraint Programming

Sudoku's rules :

- All values in a row are different
- All values in a column are different
- All values in a square are different
- You have knowledge of a few values to start with

8								
		3	6					
	7			9		2		
	5				7			
				4	5	7		
			1				3	
		1					6	8
		8	5				1	
	9					4		

Claimed to be the "World's Hardest Sudoku"

Constraint Programming

```
allDifferent(x[i][0], ..., x[i][8]) for i in {0, ..., 8}
allDifferent(x[0][i], ..., x[8][i]) for i in {0, ..., 8}
allDifferent(s[i][0], ..., s[i][8]) for i in {0, ..., 8}
Initial values : x[0][0] = 8, x[1][2] = 3, etc.
```

Constraint Solver


Solution

(Previous sudoku solved in less than 0.1 seconds)

Efficient evaluation of f

Efficiency of the meta-heuristic

= Efficiency of evaluating the minimal number of active S-boxes !



Summary of the search over 6 rounds

- We used a meta-heuristic for an efficient search.
- We proposed a new CP model which directly manages induced equations.
- We found a permutation reaching 20 active S-boxes over 6 rounds, and no characteristic with a probability better than 2^{-128} exists !

Conclusion

Number of rounds	2	3	4	5	6	7
Original key schedule	1	3	9	11	13 [†]	15 [†]
Khoo <i>et al.</i> 's permutation	1	5	10	14	18 [†]	22 [†]
Our permutation	1	5	10	15	20 [†]	23 [†]

- We cannot reach 18 S-boxes over 5 rounds, and 17 is still an open question.
- Modifying the ShiftRows operation, we can reach 21[†] S-boxes over 6 rounds.
- 22 S-boxes is an open question

[†] no characteristic with probability $> 2^{-128}$

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Efficient Search for Optimal Diffusion Layers of GFNs
- 3 Variants of the AES Key-Schedule for Better Truncated Differential Bounds
- 4 Perspectives**

- Long term goal : The "Ultimate" GFN
 - ⇒ Probably not unique, need to consider trade-offs (harder than focusing on optimality)
 - ⇒ Would lead to a nice generic tool for evaluating the security of any GFN (to some extent)
- "Provable" key-schedules ⇒ Adding concrete and well defined security arguments for the key-schedule
 - ⇒ In the end, I would like to show that using a very simple key-schedule is enough, *i.e.* convoluted key-schedules are not better than a carefully crafted simple one
- Automatic tools for cryptanalysis
 - ⇒ Improving the current ones
 - ⇒ New tools for new attacks